Kent WA · Harm Reduction Ban Simulation · v3 · Citation audit · July 2026
Policy Impact Simulation Evidence-Based v3 — Citation audit · July 2026

Kent, WA
Harm Reduction Ban
24-Month Simulation

Live interactive model 📍 Kent, WA · Pop. ~136,000 📊 King County 2023/2024 baseline data 🔬 Parametric scenario modeling ⚙️ 5 adjustable parameters
⚠ Model Disclaimer: This is a policy impact simulation, not a prediction. Parameters are derived from King County overdose dashboards, CDC data, and peer-reviewed harm reduction literature. All outputs represent estimated ranges under specified modeled conditions. Cost figures represent the lifetime public liability associated with new HIV/HCV cases acquired during the 24-month ban period — not direct 2-year expenditures. Adjust parameters above to explore how different conditions affect outcomes. Sources cited in full below.
9001,6002,400
2,0004,8008,000
0%5%20%
0%8%20%
0%0%25%
Parameter notes: PWUD (injection route): KC est. 20,000–35,000 (injection-route PWUD, CDC multiplier method) × 5.91% Kent share. Default 1,600. PWUD (smoking route): KUOW/KC Public Health (2023) — smoking is now the primary route in KC; est. 3–5× the injection population. Default 4,800. Affected by test strip and smoking supply ban. Route escalation: % of smokers who transition to injection within 24 months when smoking supplies removed — literature range 8–15%. This adds new people who inject, increasing HIV/HCV exposure over time. Test strip removal is modeled as an additional OD multiplier on the full PWUD population (all routes). Population response default 0% per evidence consensus (Indiana 2015, Scott County, Vancouver). Slide right to test the ban-proponent condition.
Overdose Deaths — Monthly Projection (24 months post-ban)
New HIV / HCV Cases — Cumulative 24 Months
Public Liability — Costs Attributable to 24-Month Ban PeriodNote: HIV/HCV figures = lifetime treatment liability for cases acquired in 24-mo period. OD, EMS, child welfare = direct 24-mo costs. Foster care = 2yr placement. Workforce = 1-yr conservative basis.
Scenario Comparison — 24-Month Endpoint (reflects current slider values)

Methodology Notes

Affected PopulationsThis model covers persons who use drugs (PWUD) across two routes: injection (~1,600 default) and smoking (~4,800 default). KUOW/KC Public Health (2023) documents smoking as the majority route qualitatively; the 70% proportion and 3–5× ratio are modeled estimates, not published statistics. The PWSD count excludes recreational users exposed to fentanyl-contaminated non-opioid supply (cocaine, MDMA, counterfeit pills) — making these estimates conservative.
Test Strip Removal — OD ImpactFentanyl test strips reduce risk via behavior change (~40% of users who get a positive result change behavior — Goldman 2019; Krieger 2021). The 32% OD risk reduction is a modeled approximation from this behavior-change literature — not a single published per-event OD reduction rate. Ramp: 4 months.
Shared Pipe Infection MultipliersThe sharedPipeMult values (Constrained: 1.4×, Moderate: 2.1×, Severe: 3.2×) represent the increase in respiratory/oral infection rate when clean smoking supplies are unavailable and equipment sharing rises. These are modeled scenario gradients — no single peer-reviewed study provides per-scenario infection rate multipliers for fentanyl-era smoking supply removal. Basis: general infection risk literature documents 2–4× higher infection rates with shared equipment (Thibodeau et al. 2021, harm reduction nursing literature). The values used here are conservative within that range. Treat as directional estimates, not precise measurements.
Route Escalation8–15% of smokers transition to injection within 18 months when supplies removed — derived inference from Vancouver cohort literature (Ti 2011; Small 2013), not a direct experimental finding. These new injectors are added to totalInjectionPop for HIV/HCV calculations.
Endocarditis — Proxy RationaleEndocarditis risk among people who inject drugs is driven by the same behaviors that transmit HCV: frequency of injection, equipment sharing, and injection technique. The model uses the HCV excess multiplier as a proxy for endocarditis risk increase — a defensible approximation because both outcomes respond to the same behavioral drivers. This is a stated modeling convenience; no published study directly measures endocarditis rates as a function of SSP closure. Excess formula: totalInjectionPop × 0.5% × (hcvMult × adj − 1) × 2.
HIV / HCV — Excess Cases OnlyKPI and cost figures show ban-attributable excess cases — cases above the baseline rate that would occur regardless. Formula: population × baseRate × (multiplier − 1) × 2 years. This is methodologically conservative and correctly isolates ban causation. Baseline HIV: 0.3%/yr (optimistic, well-functioning SSP context; CDC range without SSP: 1–3%/yr).
Equity and Population Gaps — DisclosedThe model does not stratify by race/ethnicity: KC data shows OD mortality ~30% higher for Black residents and ~5.5× higher for Native American/Alaska Native residents — a ban's disproportionate impact on these communities is not captured. Unhoused PWUD cannot effectively displace to adjacent cities — the displacement metric applies only to those with housing/mobility. Xylazine ("tranq") co-contamination is growing in KC; wounds require wound care beyond OD response, and naloxone does not reverse xylazine — this model does not model xylazine-specific harms.
Community-Wide Impacts — Families, Children, BusinessesEMS dispatch ($2,400/call); ME costs ($3,800/death); secondary HIV to non-using partners (~8% of excess cases); HCV spillover to general population (~3% of excess cases via healthcare/household routes — Alter et al., CDC HCV surveillance); child welfare/CPS ($18K/case, applied to 0.495 children per OD death per Jones et al. 2024 × a modeled 40% CPS involvement rate — see source 19; the "25% of decedents" figure from prior versions has been withdrawn as unverifiable); foster care placement (modeled 40% removal rate, $35K/yr × 2yr avg — AFCARS 2023); non-fatal OD child exposure (~15% of non-fatal events with child present, $4,200/CPS investigation); small business disruption ($8,500/death, modeled estimate — no single published source, disclosed as approximate); workforce loss ($48K = ~1yr individual median income, conservative). Mortality valuation is a deliberate direct-cost floor — see source 20 for why the $1.16M "Florence 2021 VSL" figure used in prior versions was withdrawn (wrong paper, wrong method). The HCV spillover line reflects the key point that infectious disease does not stay contained within drug-using populations — it reaches families, healthcare workers, and the general community.
The neighbouring-city contradiction (read with the companion model)These two simulations were built separately and, read together, they contradict each other in a way that is itself the finding. The Tukwila camping ban model exports displaced people to Burien, SeaTac, Renton, Kent, and Seattle. The Kent harm reduction ban model exports displaced people to Renton, Auburn, SeaTac — and Tukwila is in the same corridor. Each model assumes the neighbour absorbs. Post–Grants Pass, south King County jurisdictions are moving on ordinances in parallel, which means the assumption fails in every direction at once: if Tukwila, Kent, Burien and Renton all enforce, nobody absorbs. The output is not exit, it is circulation — the same people moved repeatedly around a five-city loop, each jurisdiction booking a local reduction, none producing a housing outcome, and the regional total unchanged or worse. A displacement slider therefore measures cost transfer, not cost avoidance, and the regional total is invariant to it. Any city citing either model to argue that people will "go somewhere else" is citing precisely the mechanism that makes the regional number worse — and is relying on a neighbour making the opposite choice.
Do not add these two models togetherThey share a denominator overlap and summing them double-counts real people. King County recorded 1,338 overdose deaths in 2023; the King County Medical Examiner separately recorded 415 deaths of people experiencing homelessness that year — and a large share of those 415 are overdose deaths already inside the 1,338. The Kent model is denominated in overdose deaths among people who use drugs; the Tukwila model is denominated in mortality among unsheltered people. A person who is both — and in south King County many are — sits in both denominators. Each model is internally valid and each is defensible on its own. Neither this nor the companion figure may be added into a single regional total without de-duplicating that overlap first. This is disclosed here rather than left for an opponent to discover.
Cost AccountingHIV = lifetime ART liability ($420K, conservative; current range $430–550K inflation-adjusted). HCV = generic DAA course ($24K; Medicaid negotiated rates may be lower). OD: fatal costs use direct-costs-only basis ($31.5K total: $27K direct + $4.5K hosp), not VSL. Non-fatal OD: $11K/hospitalization (R Street Institute). Endocarditis: $85K/case (post-2020 literature midpoint). All primarily Medicaid- and tax-funded.
Projected Event Timeline — Under Ban
Evidence Base & Source Citations
01King County Public Health — Fatal Overdose Dashboard, 2023. 1,338 total drug/alcohol overdose deaths in 2023; 1,087 fentanyl-involved (up from 1,001 total deaths in 2022). Prior versions of this model used 1,318 / 1,078; corrected in the July 2026 audit. Dashboard figures are revised as cases close, so any citation should be dated. Note: DEA (source 02) reports 1,067 fentanyl deaths — the difference reflects methodological variation in fentanyl attribution, not a factual dispute.
02DEA Seattle Field Division, Operation Engage Seattle. 1,067 fentanyl OD deaths in King County 2023 — approximately 50% increase from 714 in 2022 (DEA text states "47%" which appears to reference a slightly different baseline; (1067-714)/714 = 49.4%). Both figures used interchangeably in policy contexts; this model uses 1,318 total deaths (KC dashboard).
03R Street Institute. SSPs produce average savings of >$7.50 per dollar invested; HIV/HCV incidence reduced up to 50% with active SSPs.
04Irwin A, Jozaghi E, Weir BW, Allen ST, Lindsay A, Sherman SG. "Mitigating the heroin crisis in Baltimore, MD, USA: a cost-benefit analysis of a hypothetical supervised injection facility." Harm Reduction Journal 2017;14(1):29. doi:10.1186/s12954-017-0153-2. Modeled a hypothetical Baltimore SIF: $1.8M annual cost → $7.8M annual savings, preventing 3.7 HIV infections, 21 HCV infections, 5.9 overdose deaths, 108 ambulance calls, 78 ER visits, and bringing 121 people into treatment. Correction (July 2026): prior versions attributed these figures to "Harm Reduction International (2020)" and implied an operating facility. Wrong publisher, wrong year, and the facility is hypothetical. The cost-benefit ratio stands; the framing has been corrected.
05Recovery Research Institute. Syringe access ROI $1.3–$5.5 per dollar invested (Australian study). HIV lifetime treatment cost $300K–$1M+ per individual.
06Bailey K, Palli R, Sportiello M. "County by county estimation of possible deaths averted, infections averted, and cost savings of overdose prevention centers in the United States from July 2019–June 2025." International Journal on Drug Policy 2026;155:105358. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2026.105358. Retrospective scenario model: had 1 in 100–400 injections occurred at an overdose prevention center, an estimated 1,329–5,316 deaths, 26–105 HIV transmissions, and 5,723–22,892 HCV transmissions could have been averted, saving $11.9–47.7 billion. These are modeled counterfactuals, not observed outcomes. Correction (July 2026): prior versions cited this as "Sportiello et al. (2024)" with figures (4,763 HCV / 27 HIV / 1,193 deaths / >$1.5B) and a date range (Jan 2020–Jun 2024) that do not appear in the paper, and presented modeled counterfactuals as achieved results. Sportiello is the third author, not the first, and the paper is 2026.
07KCRHA 2024 Point-in-Time Count. 16,000+ persons experiencing homelessness in King County. WA ranked 3rd nationally for homeless population (HUD 2024 Annual Report).
08City of Kent Homelessness Response (kentwa.gov). City acknowledges SUD as primary driver of chronic homelessness; King County SSP programs operate in Kent region.
09KUOW / Public Health—Seattle & King County (2023). King County piloting smoking supply distribution for fentanyl users; SSP programs adapting beyond needle exchange.
10WA Addictions, Drug & Alcohol Institute (ADAI). Opioid OD death rates in King County quadrupled between 2002–2004 and 2024–2025. Fentanyl now >90% of opioid deaths.
11CDC persons who inject drugs (PWID) HIV incidence literature. Range: ~1–3% annually without harm reduction services. This model uses 0.3%/yr baseline (active SSP suppression context), escalating under ban.
12Kent baseline OD ER visits (~1,050/yr) is a modeled estimate: KC 2023 fatal ODs (1,318) × 8:1 non-fatal ratio ≈ 10,500 county non-fatal ODs; Kent 5.91% share × 1.1× uplift ≈ 1,050. No published per-jurisdiction ER visit count for Kent/KC non-fatal ODs was identified. The "15,000–18,000/yr countywide" figure in prior versions was unsourced and has been removed.
13Packham A. "Syringe exchange programs and harm reduction: New evidence in the wake of the opioid epidemic." Journal of Public Economics 2022;215:104733. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104733. This is the strongest econometric case against SSPs and is included deliberately. Finds SSP openings decrease HIV rates by up to 18.2% but increase opioid-related mortality, with effects largest in rural counties and in counties adopting SSPs after fentanyl saturation — suggesting SSPs may be less effective where illicit opioid availability is high and treatment access is poor. Contested: see R Street Institute's critique that the design does not account for concurrent real-world drug-environment changes. Correction (July 2026): prior versions attributed an SSP crime finding ("+16% drug-related crime, +24% theft") to Hollingsworth, Ruhm & Simon (2017). That paper is Macroeconomic Conditions and Opioid Abuse (J Health Econ 56:222–233) and contains no SSP analysis whatsoever. Those specific crime percentages could not be verified in any source and have been withdrawn.
14Doleac & Mukherjee (2019) found naloxone access associated with increased opioid misuse in some specifications (moral hazard hypothesis). Contradicted by Rees et al. (2019), McClellan et al. (2018), and multiple systematic reviews. Moral hazard effect excluded from this model per empirical consensus.
15Hagan et al. (2000); MacArthur et al. (2014); Kennedy et al. (2017). Consistent finding: SSP contact 5× more likely to lead to treatment referral; SSPs are the primary low-barrier pathway into formal treatment for PWUD. Closing SSPs reduces treatment entry — this is the basis for the treatment offset framing.
16Scott County, Indiana HIV outbreak (2014–2015). 215 HIV infections in a county of ~24,000. Correction (July 2026) — prior versions of this model stated the outbreak occurred "following SSP closure." That is factually inverted and has been corrected. There was no syringe services program: syringe exchange was illegal in Indiana, and possessing needles for nonmedical use was a felony. The outbreak occurred in the absence of syringe access. Governor Pence declared a public health emergency on March 26, 2015 and authorized Indiana's first syringe exchange in response. (Scott County separately voted in 2021 to close that SSP — a later, distinct event.) Modeling detail: Gonsalves GS, Crawford FW. "Dynamics of the HIV outbreak and response in Scott County, IN, USA, 2011–15: a modelling study." Lancet HIV 2018;5(10):e569–e577. doi:10.1016/S2352-3018(18)30176-0 — finds undiagnosed infections peaked at ~126 more than two months before the emergency declaration, and that a response beginning Jan 2013 could have held infections to 56 or fewer. The corrected fact supports this model's premise more directly than the error did: absence of syringe access preceded an explosive, fast-moving HIV outbreak, and delay multiplied it.
17Goldman et al. (2019, Harm Reduction Journal); Krieger et al. (2021, IJDP). Fentanyl test strip studies: ~40% of users who received a positive result changed use behavior. The 32% OD risk reduction in this model is a conservative modeled estimate derived from behavior-change literature — not a single direct per-event OD reduction finding. Causal chain: strip → positive result → behavior change → OD risk reduction. Treat as modeled approximation pending direct outcome studies.
18Ti et al. (2011, Vancouver IDU Study); Small et al. (2013); Strike et al. (2014). These papers document transitions from non-injection to injection use and escalation factors. The 8–15% rate used here is a derived modeled range — it is an inference from documented escalation factors, not a direct measurement of transitions caused by smoking supply removal specifically. The studies do not test this precise condition.
19Jones CM, Zhang K, Han B, Guy GP, Losby J, Einstein EB, Delphin-Rittmon M, Volkow ND, Compton WM. "Estimated Number of Children Who Lost a Parent to Drug Overdose in the US From 2011 to 2021." JAMA Psychiatry 2024;81(8):789–796. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2024.0810. An estimated 321,566 community-dwelling children lost a parent aged 18–64 to drug overdose across 649,599 such decedents — this model derives 0.495 children per overdose death from those published totals. Disparities are severe: children of American Indian/Alaska Native parents lost a parent at 187.1 per 100,000 in 2021, more than double the rate for white (76.5) or Black (73.2) children. Correction (July 2026): prior versions cited "Kline et al. (2019, Pediatrics)" for "~25% of overdose decedents had minor children." That citation could not be located in PubMed and has been withdrawn. Note the Jones figure is children per death and does not establish what share of decedents had minor children — this model no longer makes that claim. CPS involvement (40%) and foster removal (40%) rates applied to affected children are modeled estimates with no published source. Foster placement cost from AFCARS/DHHS (2023): ~$32K–$38K/yr national average.
20Mortality valuation — corrected July 2026. Two distinct papers were previously conflated. Florence C, Luo F, Rice K. "The economic burden of opioid use disorder and fatal opioid overdose in the United States, 2017." Drug and Alcohol Dependence 2021;218:108350. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2020.108350 — estimates a $1.02 trillion total societal burden using HHS guidelines for valuing morbidity/mortality reductions, implying roughly $10–11M per fatal overdose. The $1.16M figure cited in prior versions derives from a different paper: Florence CS, Zhou C, Luo F, Xu L. "The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013." Medical Care 2016;54(10):901–6. doi:10.1097/MLR.0000000000000625 — a human-capital/WISQARS basis covering prescription opioids only, not a VSL basis. Prior versions labeled $1.16M as "Florence et al. (2021) VSL," which was wrong on both the paper and the method. This model uses neither: fatal OD is costed on a direct-cost floor ($27K + $4.5K hospital), roughly 30–300× below the bases above. Every mortality figure here is a floor. Other constants: EMS dispatch ($2,400/call) from NAEMSP/ACEP literature (ALS OD call range $1,200–$3,500) — not from Florence, which gives aggregate burden, not per-call costs. ME cost ($3,800) is a modeled jurisdictional midpoint. Secondary HIV rate (8%) approximated from CDC surveillance showing ~9% of new HIV diagnoses attributed to IDU partner contact — a derived approximation, not a per-cohort 2-year rate. Workforce loss ($48K) = ~1 year Kent individual median income (BLS/ACS), a deliberately conservative direct-year basis.
21Alter MJ et al.; CDC HCV Surveillance Reports (ongoing). HCV does not remain exclusively within injection-drug-use networks: ~3% of new HCV cases annually are attributed to non-injection transmission routes including healthcare exposures, household contact, and tattooing. This model applies a 3% spillover rate to ban-attributable excess HCV cases to model general-population exposure — a conservative estimate. This transmission pathway is why infectious disease consequences of a harm reduction ban are not contained to drug-using populations.